COUR D'APPEL
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL
No: 500-10-000222-933
(455-36-000003-921)
Le 26 janvier 1996
CORAM: LES HONORABLES MAILHOT
BROSSARD
FISH, JJ.C.A.
LES ENTREPRISES M.G. DE GUY LTÉE,
APPELANTE - intimée
c.
LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC,
INTIMÉ - appelant
LA COUR, statuant sur le pourvoi de l'appelante contre un jugement
de la Cour supérieure (Bedford, 25 mai 1993, l'hon. Paul-Marcel Bellavance)
accueillant l'appel de l'intimé contre un jugement de la Cour du Québec
(chambre criminelle et pénale) et ordonnant la tenue d'un nouveau procès;
Après étude, audition et délibéré;
Pour les motifs exprimés dans les opinions des juges Louise Mailhot, André
Brossard et Morris J. Fish, déposées avec le présent arrêt;
REJETTE le pourvoi avec dépens établis selon le tarif en vigueur.
LOUISE MAILHOT, J.C.A.
ANDRÉ BROSSARD, J.C.A.
MORRIS J. FISH, J.C.A.
Pour l'appelante:
Me Armand Rousseau
Pour l'intimé:
Me Robert L. Rivest
Date d'audition: 27 mars 1995
COUR D'APPEL
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL
No: 500-10-000223-931
(455-36-000004-929)
Le 26 janvier 1996
CORAM: LES HONORABLES MAILHOT
BROSSARD
FISH, JJ.C.A.
GASTON FLORENT,
APPELANT - intimé
c.
LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC,
INTIMÉ - appelant
LA COUR, statuant sur le pourvoi de l'appelant contre un jugement de
la Cour supérieure (Bedford, 25 mai 1993, l'hon. Paul-Marcel Bellavance)
accueillant l'appel de l'intimé contre un jugement de la Cour du Québec
(chambre criminelle et pénale) et ordonnant la tenue d'un nouveau procès;
Après étude, audition et délibéré;
Pour les motifs exprimés dans les opinions des juges Louise Mailhot, André
Brossard et Morris J. Fish, déposées avec le présent arrêt;
REJETTE le pourvoi avec dépens établis selon le tarif en vigueur.
LOUISE MAILHOT, J.C.A.
ANDRÉ BROSSARD, J.C.A.
MORRIS J. FISH, J.C.A.
Pour l'appelant:
Me Armand Rousseau
Pour l'intimé:
Me Robert L. Rivest
Date d'audition: 27 mars 1995
COUR D'APPEL
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL
No: 500-10-000221-935
(455-36-000002-923)
Le 26 janvier 1996
CORAM: LES HONORABLES MAILHOT
BROSSARD
FISH, JJ.C.A.
GUY FLORENT,
APPELANT - intimé
c.
LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC,
INTIMÉ - appelant
LA COUR, statuant sur le pourvoi de l'appelant contre un jugement de
la Cour supérieure (Bedford, 25 mai 1993, l'hon. Paul-Marcel Bellavance)
accueillant l'appel de l'intimé contre un jugement de la Cour du Québec
(chambre criminelle et pénale) et ordonnant la tenue d'un nouveau procès;
Après étude, audition et délibéré;
Pour les motifs exprimés dans les opinions des juges Louise Mailhot, André
Brossard et Morris J. Fish, déposées avec le présent arrêt;
REJETTE le pourvoi avec dépens établis selon le tarif en vigueur.
LOUISE MAILHOT, J.C.A.
ANDRÉ BROSSARD, J.C.A.
MORRIS J. FISH, J.C.A.
Pour l'appelant:
Me Armand Rousseau
Pour l'intimé:
Me Robert L. Rivest
Date d'audition: 27 mars 1995
COUR D'APPEL
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL
No: 500-10-000222-933
(455-36-000003-921)
500-10-000221-935
(455-36-000002-923)
500-10-000223-931
(455-36-000004-929)
CORAM: LES HONORABLES MAILHOT
BROSSARD
FISH, JJ.C.A.
LES ENTREPRISES M.G. DE GUY LTÉE,
GASTON FLORENT,
GUY FLORENT,
APPELANTS - (intimés)
c.
LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC,
INTIMÉ - (appelant)
OPINION DE LA JUGE MAILHOT
J'ai pris connaissance de l'opinion de mon collègue Fish.
La question principale que soulève ce pourvoi, et la seule à laquelle il me
suffit de répondre, est de savoir si lalégislation en cause est imprécise et si
elle a pu causer ou si elle cause aux appelants un préjudice actuel.
Le juge Gonthier s'est exprimé au nom de la Cour suprême du Canada à trois
reprises sur la question de nullité pour cause d'imprécision, ayant eu
l'occasion, comme il précise, d'étudier en profondeur la théorie de
l'imprécision: Voir les arrêts R. c. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical
Society, [1992] 2 R.C.S. 606 ; Ontario c. Canadien Pacifique Ltée,
[1995] 2 R.C.S. 1031 ; Ruffo c. Conseil de la magistrature, Cour
suprême du Canada, no. 23127, le 14 décembre 1995.
Je n'ai rien à ajouter aux motifs exprimés par mon collègue Fish sur cette
question dont il traite dans la dernière partie de son opinion et je suis
d'avis, pour ces motifs, de rejeter le pourvoi avec dépens comme il le propose.
LOUISE MAILHOT, J.C.A.
COUR D'APPEL
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL
No: 500-10-000221-935
(455-36-000002-923)
(455-36-000003-921)
500-10-000223-931
(455-36-000004-929)
CORAM: LES HONORABLES MAILHOT
BROSSARD
FISH, JJ.C.A.
LES ENTREPRISES M.G. DE GUY LTÉE,
GASTON FLORENT,
GUY FLORENT,
APPELANTS - (intimés)
c.
LE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC,
INTIMÉ - (appelant)
OPINION DU JUGE BROSSARD
J'ai pris connaissance des opinions des mes collègues les juges Mailhot et Fish
et, comme ma collègue Mailhot, je m'en remets essentiellement aux motifs exprimés
par le juge Fishpour rejeter, dans les circonstances du présent cas, la théorie
de la nullité pour cause d'imprécision.
Le fait qui me frappe, en l'espèce, est qu'il était facile de déterminer ce qui
constituait, dans le cas de la Baie Mississiquoi, "... la limite des
hautes eaux printanières moyennes...". La donnée objective était
disponible, résultant de mesures systématiquement enregistrées entre le 21 mars
et le 21 juin de chaque année, de 1965 à 1987, par la station hydrométrique de
Phillipsburg. Ce fait, joint aux énoncés de principe du juge Gonthier, au nom
de la Cour suprême du Canada, dans les trois arrêts mentionnés par ma collègue,
suffit pour conclure que toute imprécision dans la législation en cause, pour
autant qu'il en existe, en théorie, n'était pas de nature à causer aux
appelants un préjudice actuel ou réel.
Ceci ne signifie cependant pas, à mon avis, que la norme utilisée, dans les
termes précités, ne gagnerait pas à être précisée ou même qu'elle ne pourrait
pas, en d'autres circonstances, être jugée suffisamment imprécise pour causer
préjudice et, par voie de conséquence, être jugée sans portée normative. En
effet, en l'absence de relevés constants, fréquents ou d'une certaine
régularité, quant à d'autres surfaces d'eau, un problème factuel pourrait
peut-être alors se poser quant à la façon de déterminer cette "moyenne".
S'agirait-il alors de la moyenneà l'intérieur de la période annuelle du 21 mars
au 21 juin d'une seule année donnée, d'une moyenne établie sur plusieurs années
et, dans l'affirmative sur combien, etc ?
Mais tel n'est pas le cas en l'instance.
Par ailleurs, comme ma collègue la juge Mailhot, je ne considère pas nécessaire
d'émettre quelque opinion que ce soit quant à l'application de la Charte au
problème qui nous était soumis.
Comme mes collègues, je suis donc d'avis de rejeter les pourvois avec dépens.
ANDRÉ BROSSARD, J.C.A.
COURT OF APPEAL
PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC
MONTRÉAL REGISTRY
No: 500-10-000221-935
(455-36-000002-923)
500-10-000222-933
(455-36-000003-921)
500-10-000223-931
(455-36-000004-929)
CORAM: THE HONOURABLE LOUISE MAILHOT
ANDRÉ BROSSARD
MORRIS J. FISH, JJ.A.
LES ENTREPRISES M.G. DE GUY
LTÉE, GASTON FLORENT,
GUY FLORENT,
APPELLANTS - respondents
v.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC,
RESPONDENT - appellant
OPINION OF FISH, J.A.
This case concerns a regulation adopted by the Government of Québec to protect
our lakes and rivers.
The regulation requires prior authorization for designated works within the average
spring high water line of certain bodies of water.
Appellants contend that the regulation is constitutionally invalid because it
fails to define the phrase average spring high water line and is
therefore so vague as to violate the principles of fundamental justice.
Foremost among these principles, as they relate to the requirement of
reasonable precision, is that those subject under penal sanction to
restrictions upon their behaviour are entitled to know in advance what they may
and may not do. The regulation under attack in this case, according to
appellants, falls short of that standard because it does not set out in
concrete terms the legal limits it purports to impose on their behaviour.
Appellants contend as well that the regulation permits arbitrary application,
in that its enforcement depends not on objective considerations clearly
enunciated, but rather on the subjective interpretation of the enforcer.
The issue of vagueness was first raised by the trial judge after he had
reserved the matter for judgment. After hearing theparties, the judge found
that the regulation violated the rule against vagueness long known to
administrative law and he therefore acquitted appellants. Section 7 of the Charter
was not then considered at all.
The Attorney General appealed to Superior Court, where the regulation was found
to be valid, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all
counts.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court.
For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.
I
The offences charged
Les Entreprises M.G. de Guy Ltée ("Les Entreprises") was tried and
acquitted in Quebec Court on ten counts of performing work on a watercourse in
violation of s. 31.1 of the Environmental Quality Act, R.S.Q., c. Q-2.
Marcel and Gaston Florent were tried and acquitted for having incited Les
Entreprises to do so.
Section 31.1 of the Act provides:
No person may undertake any construction, work, activity or operation, or carry out work according to a plan or programme, in the cases provided for by regulation of the Government without following the environmental impact assessment and review procedure and obtaining an authorization certificate from the Government.
Pursuant to s. 31.9(a), the Government may adopt regulations to "determine
the classes of construction, works, plans, programmes, operations, works or
activities to which section 31.1 applies".
Section 2(b) of the Regulation respecting environmental impact assessment
and review, R.R.Q., c. Q-2, r. 9, adopted pursuant to s. 31.9(a) of the Act,
reads in part:
2. List: The constructions, works, plans, programmes, operations and activities described below are subject to the environmental impact assessment and review procedure provided for in Division IV.1 of the Act and must be the subject of a certificate of authorization issued by the Government in accordance with section 31.5 of the Act:
...
(b) any programme or project involving the dredging, digging, filling, levelling off or backfilling of a watercourse referred to in Schedule A or of a lake, within the average spring high water line, over a distance of 300 metres or more or an area of 5 000 square metres or more ... ;
In virtue of s. 110, paragraph 2, of the Act:
The person who continues, day after day, ... the carrying on of an activity ... without holding the certificate of authorization required by ... section 31.1 is also guilty of a separate offence, day by day, to the extent that the said certificate is required. The sentences contemplated in section 106 apply to these offences.
Finally, with respect to the offences that concern us here, s. 106 provides for
fines ranging, for natural persons, from $600 to $20,000 for a first violation,
and from $4,000 to $40,000 for subsequent convictions; and, for corporations,
"a minimum fine three times higher and a maximum fine six times
higher".
II
The facts
Uncontradicted expert evidence established at trial that the average spring
high water line for Missisquoi Bay, according to measurements systematically
recorded between March 21 and June 21 from 1965 to 1987, was 30.28 geodesic
metres. The lowest level noted during this entire period was 29.15 (1965); the
highest, 30.89 (1976). These measurements were taken and documented by the
Philipsburg Hydrometric Station.
In this regard, the trial judge found:
...Suivant les calculs que l'on peut faire grâce aux cotes fournies pour les années 1965 à 1987, le fait de prendre deux (2) ou plusieurs de ces années aurait presque toujours donné une moyenne supérieure à trente (30) mètres, soit plus que l'élévation de tout le terrain de camping de la défenderesse.
He observed, however, that inclusion of earlier years would result in a lower
average.
The trial judge noted that there was no dispute as to the following elements:
Les Entreprises had carried out the work to which the charges relate; the body
of water in question, Missisquoi Bay, is included in Schedule A of the Regulation;
the mandatory environmental impact assessment and review procedure was not
followed; and the required certificate of authorization was not obtained.
Finally, the judge found that the works undertaken by Entreprises exceeded both
of the alternative limits provided for in the Regulation, (300 metres in
length or 5,000 square metres in area).
III
Judgments below
The void for vagueness issue was initially raised in this case by the trial
judge after reserving the matter for judgment. Notice was then served by
appellants upon respondent pursuant to s. 34 of the Code of Penal Procedure,
R.S.Q., c. C-25.1, and the issue was argued thereafter.
The trial judge concluded that the "average spring high water line"
was not a known or defined norm. The regulation failed to specify which (or how
many) years are to be considered in determining the average. The legislator
could have fixed an objective standard but had failed to do so.
In the result, said the judge, s. 2(b) of the Regulation does not
disclose to interested citizens the precise extent ("l'étendue
exacte") of their rights and obligations:
Il lui est impossible de connaître la "ligne des hautes eaux printanières moyennes" puisque la période de référence pour faire le calcul n'est pas indiquée. La source des informations, soit les niveaux d'eau publiés par Environnement Canada, ne l'est pas non plus mais ce seul
fait n'aurait sans doute pas justifié la conclusion à laquelle
le Tribunal en arrive.
The judge concluded that s. 2(b) was void
for vagueness. He therefore acquitted appellants.
An appeal by the attorney general against these acquittals was allowed in
Superior Court by Bellavance J., who ordered a new trial on all counts.
Bellavance J. stated:
Il ne faut pas confondre difficulté d'interprétation et imprécision d'un règlement. À mon avis, l'expression "limite des hautes eaux printanières moyennes" composée de mots simples est précise. Elle sera évidemment relative et variable annuellement selon la quantité de neige tombée, la vitesse de la fonte printanière, etc... Cependant, elle est déterminable annuellement et peut généralement faire l'objet d'un calcul basé sur un certain nombre d'années. Elle sera alors la norme à suivre ou le guide de référence pour l'époque et le lieu où l'on voudra entreprendre des travaux. (references omitted)
Unlike the trial judge, Bellavance J. doubted whether the legislator could
reasonably establish a more precise norm. He noted that the average spring high
water line would be subject tovariation as a result of a number of factors,
including the region or even the body of water in question. Determining the
"average high spring water line" would in each instance be, according
to Bellavance J., more a question of evidence than a matter of statutory
interpretation.
Finally, Justice Bellavance concluded that the wording of the regulation was
not so vague as to violate the principles of fundamental justice.
Accordingly, he allowed the appeal, set aside the appellants' acquittals, and
ordered a new trial.
IV
Threshold issues
(a) Charter not invoked
at trial
As I have already mentioned, the vagueness issue was first raised by the trial
judge after he had reserved the matter for judgment.
The Supreme Court of Canada had not yet then decided R. v. Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 , where the Court set out to
answer questions left open by its eight earlierjudgments touching upon
"the proper place of [vagueness and overbreadth] within Charter
analysis"(1).
While the Court's position on the issue of overbreadth continues to evolve(2), its decision in Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical eliminated
any earlier doubt whether a vague enactment may be declared inoperative
pursuant to ss. 7 and 52 of the Charter.
This explains why, in the proceedings as we have them, the void for vagueness
issue is canvassed in relation to s. 7 of the Charter only in the
judgment of the Superior Court: appellants had relied at trial (even then, only
after the issue was raised by the trial judge) solely on the rule
against vagueness that has long been a recognized principle of administrative
law.
Respondent does not challenge appellants' right to invoke s. 7 for the first
time in this Court. Moreover, the principles governing nullity for vagueness
under administrative law, despite their distinct history and purpose, are
similar in substance to thoseapplicable under s. 7 of the Charter(3). Any differences as to the degree of precision required of
statutes on one hand and delegated legislation on the other are not decisive in
this case(4).
Though they have not previously invoked the Charter, I would therefore
allow appellants to now rest their vagueness submission on s. 7, as they have
chosen to do.
Respondent has raised two further questions regarding the applicability of s. 7
to this case. The first is whether persons charged with the offences that
concern us here are subject to a punishment that engages their liberty or
security interest, within the meaning of s. 7. The second question is whether
appellants, in order to claim the protection of s. 7, must demonstrate thatthe
vagueness of the impugned legislation has caused them actual prejudice.
I turn now to the first of these questions.
(b) Fines and s. 7 liberty or security interest
As its very wording makes plain, s. 7 of the Charter enshrines only the
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.
Section 106 of the statute under which appellants are charged sets out the
punishment for the offences with which they are charged. It provides for
mandatory minimum fines, but not for imprisonment.
Since the imposition of fines does not deprive offenders of their right to life,
liberty or security of the person, respondent submits that none of the
appellants can invoke s. 7 of the Charter.
I propose to deal with this submission, but pause first to explain why,
strictly speaking, it is unnecessary for me to do so.
In order for appellants to succeed, they would have to establish, insofar as
their vagueness claim depends on s. 7 of the Charter,not only that the
legislation under which they are charged affects the liberty or security of
defendants, but also that it is impermissibly vague and therefore violates a
principle of fundamental justice.
As will later be seen, I have concluded that the Regulation is not
impermissibly vague. The appeal fails for that reason.
I nonetheless think it right to explain why I would have been inclined, had I
reached a different conclusion on the vagueness issue, to reject respondents'
submission that s. 7 does not apply because the Act provides only for
fines.
Section 347 of the Code of Penal Procedure stipulates that an order of
imprisonment in default of payment may be made if the justice believes that no
other method provided in the Code will be effective in recovering the
fine. Section 237 of the Code, moreover, authorizes the sentencing judge
to order imprisonment failing immediate payment of the fine if he or she is
satisfied that the defendant will abscond.
The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to determine whether provisions of this
sort can be said to engage the liberty or security interest protected by s. 7
of the Charter. Even at the appellate level, the issue has not yet been
settled.
In Schnaiberg c. Métallurgistes Unis d'Amérique, Section Locale 8990,
[1993] R.J.Q. 55 (C.A.), the applicability of s. 7 to offences punishable by
fine was dealt with in these terms (at pp. 58-9)
:
... la combinaison des dispositions applicables du Code du travail, de l'ancienne Loi sur les poursuites sommaires et maintenant du Code de procédure pénale ne prévoit un emprisonnement que dans la seule hypothèse où l'amende (qui est la seule sanction de l'infraction reprochée) n'est pas acquittée. La menace à la liberté de l'appelant m'apparaît donc réalisable uniquement comme solution ultime à l'inexécution du jugement, tous les autres moyens d'exécution de la sentence ayant été inefficaces. Cette menace est donc purement conjecturale, largement hypothétique et effectivement incertaine. (References omitted.)
It appears from the report, however, that s. 237 of the Code of penal
procedure was not drawn to the Court's attention. Moreover, the ratio
of the decision was that there had in that case been no violation of the
principles of fundamental justice. It was therefore unnecessary for the Court
to decide whether the liberty or security interest had been engaged, within the
meaning of s. 7 of the Charter.
The issue was considered, albeit in a different context, by Arbour J.A. of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Nickel City Transport Ltd.(5)
Justice Arbour's conclusion proceeded from a careful study of the Provincial
Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, which contains provisions similar to
our own: s. 69(4)(b) empowers the sentencing judge in exceptional circumstances
to order imprisonment in default of immediate payment of the fine imposed,
while s. 69(3) permits any justice to order imprisonment where any delays
allowed for payment have expired and other reasonable methods of collection
have failed or are unlikely to succeed.
Noting that 5,460 people were imprisoned in Ontario in 1990-91 for having
failed to pay fines, and that the Provincial Offences Act did not
specify that inability to pay was an adequate excuse, Arbour J.A. was unwilling
to assume that those imprisoned for non- payment were wilful defaulters. She
therefore concluded (at p. 147):
I think that the fact that imprisonment can sometimes be ordered by the sentencing judge, together with the fact that neither the imposition of fines nor the order of imprisonment in default are based on a consideration of ability to pay, means that imprisonment in default of payment of fines is a real, not a remote possibility, for persons subject to the Provincial Offences Act. I also think that the number of persons imprisoned under that statute, declining as it may be(6), indicates how real that possibility is.
Other appeal courts have reached essentially the same conclusion but in cases
involving legislation that differs from that of Ontario and Québec(7).
In the present case, the Act imposes a minimum fine regardless of
capacity to pay. Immediate imprisonment is a real possibility under s. 237 of
the Code of penal procedure and ultimate imprisonment is contemplated by
s. 347 as well. The combined effect of these provisions, for the reasons given
by Arbour J.A. in Nickel City Transport, supra, appears to me to
impair the right to liberty of defendants in a meaningful rather than an
insignificant way.
Accordingly, I am inclined to consider that the prosecution of appellants
Gaston and Marcel Florent engages their liberty interest, within the meaning of
s. 7 of the Charter.
If it does, this would enure not only to their benefit, but also to that of Les
Entreprises, since "[a]ny accused, whether corporate or individual, may
defend a criminal charge by arguing that the law under which the charge is
brought is constitutionally invalid": R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 , at pp. 313-314.
More recently, in Canadian Pacific Limited, supra, Lamer C.J.
stated (at pp. 157-158):
...in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 , the Court confirmed that a corporation was entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the law under which it was charged,
notwithstanding the fact that the
constitutional challenge was based on s. 7, which does not grant rights to
corporations...In my view, this principle applies equally to s. 7 vagueness
challenges.
In this context, no distinction may be drawn between federal and provincial
offences: R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 R.C.S. 541 . (S.C.C.).
Without expressing a decided view, I would therefore be disposed, as mentioned
earlier, to reject respondent's submission that prosecution for the offences
here in issue does not engage the liberty or security interest of defendants
and is for that reason not subject to the fundamental justice requirement of s.
7 of the Charter.
(c) S. 7 and the actual prejudice requirement
Relying on Albright v. The Queen(8), respondent further submits that appellants cannot invoke s. 7
of the Charter because they have failed to demonstrate that the
vagueness of the Regulation caused them actual prejudice in this case.
This submission appears to rest on the doctrine of standing adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in such cases as Parker v. Levy(9) and Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.(10). Under that doctrine, constitutional challenges to legislation
cannot be founded on hypothetical fact situations: rather, the challenger must
show that the impugned provision violates his or her rights in the concrete
reality determined by the circumstances of the case.
The Supreme Court of Canada, as appears from Big M Drug Mart Ltd., Wholesale
Travel Group Inc. and Canadian Pacific Limited, all previously
cited, has taken a different approach in Charter adjudication. In this
country, as I mentioned earlier, "[a]ny accused, whether corporate or
individual, may defend a criminal charge by arguing that the law under which
the charge is brought is constitutionally invalid"(11). This approach is largely dictated by s. 52, which provides
that "any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect".
To the extent that respondent's submission relies on the American doctrine of
standing, I believe it has no merit.
Nor is Albright of any assistance to respondent. In that case, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the certified extract of an accused's driving
record was admissible under the common law to prove prior convictions. The
absence of a requirement of notice, it was found, did not violate s. 7 of the Charter;
in those rare cases where a lack of notice was shown to have violated the
accused's right to a fair trial, the accused could apply for a remedy under s.
24.
Here, appellants do not seek a remedy under s. 24 of the Charter. They
allege that the provision under which they are charged contravenes s. 7 and is
therefore, pursuant to s. 52, of no force or effect. As mentioned earlier a
defendant in this country may argue that the law under which he or she is
charged is constitutionally invalid: there is no requirement of actual,
personal prejudice.
Finally, this is not a case where the appellants, as in Canadian Pacific
Limited, supra, advance an argument of "peripheral
vagueness". That is to say, they do not concede that the Regulation
clearly covers their conduct but is nonetheless void foruncertainty because its
imprecise terms fail to delineate its full reach.
Nor does respondent defend the Regulation on the ground that it clearly
applies to the "core of conduct"(12) brought home in this case to appellants.
Rather, both sides have taken the position that the outcome of the appeal
depends on whether the Regulation is unconstitutionally vague for
failure to define its touchstone phrase, "average spring high water
line".
I finally turn now to that question.
V
The rule against legislative vagueness, now constitutionally entrenched, is
like many others easier to state than to apply.
Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society, supra, Gonthier J. stated(13):
The doctrine of vagueness can therefore be summed up in this proposition: a law will be found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate.
In Canadian Pacific Limited, speaking for the Court on this issue(14), Gonthier J. reiterated(15):
As I observed there [in Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society], the principles of fundamental justice in s. 7 require that laws provide the basis for coherent judicial interpretation, and sufficiently delineate an "area of risk". Thus "a law will be found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate"...This requirement of legal precision is founded on two rationales: the need to provide fair notice to citizens of prohibited conduct, and the need to proscribe enforcement discretion.
Factors to be considered by the courts in scrutinizing legislation for
vagueness include:
(a) the need for flexibility and the interpretive role of the courts, (b) the impossibility of achieving absolute certainty, a standard of intelligibility being more appropriate and (c) the possibility that many varying judicial interpretations of a given disposition may exist and perhaps coexist
.(16)
In Canadian Pacific Limited, supra, Gonthier J. found, as I have
already mentioned, that the "standard of legal precision required by s. 7
will vary depending on the nature and subject matter of the particular
legislative provision"(17). "The s. 7 doctrine of vagueness," he added,
"must not be used to straight-jacket the state in social policy fields"(18).
One such field is environmental protection -- the very subject matter of the
legislation both here and in Canadian Pacific Limited.(19)
With respect to legislation of this kind, Gonthier J. stated:
The social importance of environmental protection is obvious, yet the nature of the environment does not lend itself to precise codification.(20)
[...]
In the context of environmental protection legislation, a strict requirement of drafting precision might well undermine the ability of the legislature to provide for a comprehensive and flexible regime
.(21)
It is true that this case, unlike Canadian Pacific Limited, involves a
regulation rather than a statute and is therefore subject to the administrative
law prohibition against vagueness as well as the requirement of precision
protected as a principle of fundamental justice by s. 7 of the Charter.
The administrative law test has traditionally been framed in more demanding
language than its Charter counterpart. It is set out as follows by
Dussault and Borgeat:
En édictant des normes générales de comportement, l'autorité réglementante a l'obligation de donner à celle-ci un degré de précision et de détail permettant aux personnes visées de connaître l'étendue exacte de leurs droits et obligations.(22)
Even so, regulations need not spell out every last detail. Ultimately, lack of
precision will be fatal only if it fails to provide a reasonable basis for
determining its reach(23):
Somme toute, il faut que l'imprécision atteigne un tel degré de gravité que le juge en vienne à la conclusion qu'un homme raisonnablement intelligent, suffisamment informé, compte tenu du caractère technique du règlement, est dans l'impossibilité de déterminer le sens du règlement et de régler en conséquence sa conduite
.(24)
Appellants, as I mentioned earlier, rely in this Court on s. 7 of the Charter;
moreover, any difference between the rule of administrative law and the rule
under the Charter would not affect the outcome of this appeal. Both
rules require fair notice of prohibited conduct. And both rules, in order to
protect citizens against arbitrary prosecution, prohibit the sub-delegation
ofdiscretionary powers to the authorities in charge of applying the law(25).
Seen in this light, respondent's submission concerning appellants' failure to
establish actual prejudice in the circumstances of this case transcends the
issue of standing and bears on the main question of substance.
Shortly stated, that question is whether the phrase average spring high
water line "so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance
for legal debate"(26). Or, as Gonthier J. put the test in Canadian Pacific Limited,
does that phrase, when used in an enactment adopted for the protection of the
environment, such as the Regulation attacked by appellants,
"provide the basis for coherent judicial interpretation, and sufficiently
delineate an 'area of risk'"(27).
Let me begin by pointing out that the expression "high water line" is
itself no stranger to the law. It has long been accepted, incommon law as in
civil law, in private law as in public law, as an appropriate and sufficiently
concrete criterion for determining both property rights and legal obligations.
Black's Law Dictionary(28), for example, carries the following entry:
High water line or mark. The line on the shore to which high tide rises under normal weather conditions. High-water mark is generally computed as a mean or average high tide and not as extreme height of water. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516. High water mark of navigable river is line to which high water ordinarily reaches and is not line reached by water in unusual floods; it is that line below which soil is unfit for vegetation or agricultural purposes. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 108 Ariz. 258, 495 P.2d 1312, 1314.
Similarly, The Dictionary of Canadian Law(29) defines "normal high water mark" as:
The visible high water mark of a lake or river where the presence and action of water are so usual and so long continued in ordinary years as to mark upon the bed of the lake or river a character distinct from that of the bank thereof with respect to vegetation and the nature of the soil itself.
Accordingly, terms such as la ligne des hautes eaux and highest water
mark reached by the navigable river without flooding and ligne des
hautes eaux naturelles have long been used to fix the line between private
property and the public domain(30). Likewise, ligne naturelle des hautes eaux has been used
in the regulatory context explained by an expert witness in the present matter(31).
Bearing these established usages in mind, I do not believe that the phrase average
spring high water line "so lacks in precision as not to give
sufficient guidance for legal debate" (Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical
Society, supra). On the contrary, I am persuaded that it provides
the required "basis for coherent judicial interpretation, and sufficiently
delineate[s] an 'area of risk'" (Canadian Pacific Limited, supra).
Appellants' submission that the Regulation is unconstitutionally vague
ultimately turns on whether the qualifier "average" rendersthe entire
phrase average spring high water line impervious to coherent
interpretation.
In my respectful view, the short answer to this submission is that
"average" is frequently used in an easily understood sense that
harmonizes well with the evident purpose of the Regulation. This is no
less true of the word "moyenne", which is used in the French text (la
limite des hautes eaux printanières moyennes).
Four examples will suffice:
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 5th ed., Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 80:
__________
average, n. Generally prevailing rate, degree or amount; ordinary standard; medial estimate...
average, a. Estimated by average; of the usual standard...
The Random House Dictionary, Ballantyne Books ed., 1978, p. 59:
__________
average, n., adj., v... 1. a typical amount, rate, etc. ... 4. on the or an average, usually or typically.
Le Grand Robert de la langue française, 2e éd., 1992, t.6, pp. 626-8:
__________
MOYEN, ENNE adj. et n.
1. Qui se trouve entre deux choses. (Dans l'espace, entre deux parties extrêmes ou deux choses de même nature.)
2. ... Qui, par ses dimensions ou sa nature, tient le milieu entre deux extrêmes...
3. (Après le nom). Qui est du type le plus courant. Courant, ordinaire.
MOYENNE n.f. 1. Ce qui tient le milieu; type généralement le plus courant, éloigné des extrêmes...
Larouse dictionnaire du français contemporain, Paris, 1966, p. 756:
__________
moyen, enne adj., 1. Se dit de ce qui tient le milieu entre deux extrémités, entre deux périodes extrêmes, entre deux choses...
moyenne n.f. 1. Ce qui s'éloigne des extrêmes, ce qui est au milieu de deux choses...
Considering the subject matter of the Regulation and the fact that it
applies to a large number of diverse watercourses, those responsible for its
adoption could not reasonably have been expected to define the operative norm
in terms of a fixed formula covering, in all instances, the same number of
years. Recalling the words of Gonthier J. in Canadian Pacific Limited, supra,
at p. 540, this is certainly one instance where "a strict requirement of
drafting precision might well undermine the ability of the legislature to
provide for a comprehensive and flexible regime".
Instead, the drafters of the Regulation chose language capable of
flexible but not capricious application.
More specifically, they first adopted as a basic criterion the "high water
line" concept which, as we have seen, is an established guide for fixing a
boundary on land subjected to the impact of contiguous bodies of water. Since
the enactment is specifically concerned with the environmental effect of extensive
modification to land that is regularly subject to inundation, the time frame to
be taken into consideration was limited to spring -- when inundation is most
likely to recur. This seasonal restriction did not, in my view, make elusive
the "high water line" criterion that would otherwise delineate a
readily discoverable "area of risk" within the meaning of Canadian
Pacific Limited, supra.
A further qualification was then required in order to prevent opportunists from
taking advantage of an unusually low water level during a particularly dry
spring, while at the same time ensuring a fair application of the Regulation
in years of the opposite extreme. Hence the modifier "average", in
the sense of "usual" or "ordinary".
Attributing this sense to "average" as used in the Regulation
is consistent with its common usage. That, I believe, is apparent from the
dictionary definitions I have reproduced. It is aninterpretation that also
conforms well to the evident policy objective of the Regulation and
makes possible its application to the full range of watercourses meant to
benefit from its protection. And it is consistent as well with the legal
concept of "high water line" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary,
in the Canadian Legal Dictionary, both supra, and in the case law
to which I have referred.
Read this way, moreover, the Regulation fully respects both rationales
that underlie the vagueness doctrine now entrenched as a principle of
fundamental justice enshrined in s. 7 of the Charter: it affords
"the average citizen, with an average understanding of the subject matter
of the prohibition,...adequate notice of the prohibited conduct"(32), while at the same time protecting the citizen against
arbitrary or capricious prosecution.
The Regulation governs extensive undertakings only and applies to
explicitly identified watercourses. In most cases, those who plan the kind of
works described in any of the places listed will be able, as in the present
case, to discover the average spring high water line by obtaining readily
available data from the local hydrometric station. Where such data is
unavailable, or where the information provided is considered by an interested
person to beunrepresentative, insufficient, or unreliable, that person can
resort to other sources of information tending to identify the highest level to
which the watercourse in question ordinarily rises during the spring.
As a practical matter, since the Regulation applies only to works
covering a distance of 300 metres or more, or an area of 5000 square
metres or more, the "area of risk" will be clear enough to
satisfy the notice requirement and not so uncertain as to permit arbitrary
enforcement of the law. And once charges are laid, the prosecution will have
the burden of proof -- and the defendant, the benefit of any doubt that remains
once all the evidence, ocular or statistical, has been presented to the court.
VI
The issue on the appeal is simply whether the impugned Regulation is
unconstitutionally vague. I have already explained why I believe that it is not
and, more particularly, why I have concluded that the terms of the Regulation
afforded appellants sufficient guidance as to how they were required to behave.
Their conduct throughout appears to me to confirm that conclusion.
Appellants, having examined the Regulation, evidently understood upon
reading the charges why and of what they were accused. They appeared, pleaded
not guilty and defended themselves at trial without disputing the particularity
of the charges or the certainty and precision of the legislation upon which
they were brought.
They never moved to quash the informations on the ground of vagueness, as
permitted by s. 184 (8) of the Code of Penal Procedure. Nor did they
move for details, as they were entitled to do under s. 178 of that Code.
Be that as it may, the Superior Court judge ordered that the matter be returned
to the trial court instead of evaluating the evidence himself. Accordingly, I
do not think it appropriate for me, sitting in appeal of that judgment, to
express a decided view as to the sufficiency of the evidence according to the
record as we have it.
I would simply dismiss the appeal, with costs fixed according to the applicable
tariff.
MORRIS J. FISH, J.A.
1. Per Gonthier J. for the Court,
at p. 621.
2. Compare Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical
Society, (at pp. 630-632); R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 , per
Cory J., speakingfor the majority of the Court, at pp. 792-94; and R. v.
CanadianPacific Limited (1995), 41 C.R. (4th) 147, particularly at pp.
190ff. (reasons of Gonthier J.), and pp. 159 ff. (the separate reasonsof the
Chief Justice, concurred in by Sopinka and Cory JJ.).
3. For the administrative
doctrine, see René Dussault et LouisBorgeat, Traité de droit administratif,
2e éd., t. 1, Presses del'Université Laval, 1984, at p. 539 ff. For the
constitutional one,see R. v. Canadian Pacific Limited, supra, per
Gonthier J., for themajority, at p. 175, and Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical
Society, supra,at p. 626 ff.
4. As to the relevance of the
nature and subject matter of theimpugned enactment, Gonthier J., writing for
the Court in NovaScotia Pharmaceutical, supra, stated that the
standard of precisionset out in that case "applies to all enactments,
irrespective ofwhether they are civil, criminal, administrative or other"
(at p.642). In R v. Canadian Pacific Limited, supra, Gonthier
J.recalled what he had written in Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical, andadded:
"I would stress, however, that the standard of legalprecision required by
s. 7 will vary depending on the nature andsubject matter of a particular
legislative provision" (at p. 176). The importance of context in likewise
reflected in the reasons ofGonthier J., speaking for the majority in Ruffo
v. Conseil de laMagistrature, S.C.C. No. 23127, December 14, 1995, at pp.
60 ff.
5. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 115.
All three members of theCourt concluded that the offence charged in that case
was of strictliability. Only Arbour J.A., however, found that the
legislationcreating the offence would otherwise violate the principles
offundamental justice since imprisonment was a possible sanction invirtue of s.
69 of Ontario's Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990,c. P.33.
6. In 1984-85, 10,371 persons
were imprisoned in Ontario fornon-payment of fines imposed under provincial
legislation. InQuébec, the number of persons imprisoned for non-payment of
fineshas more than doubled from 5,163 in 1989-90 to 10,722 in
1993-94:see Statistiques correctionnelles du Québec, 1993-94, Tableau
25,p. 42. No breakdown is provided for provincial as opposed tofederal offences.
However, from other information made availableby the Direction générale des
services correctionnels("Statistiques concernant les Accusations") it
appears that 11.5%of those incarcerated at the Montreal Detention Centre
(Bordeaux)on February 16, 1995 (160 out of a total of 1,391), were
imprisonedfor non-payment of fines imposed under municipal by-laws
andprovincial statutes.
7. See, for example, R. v.
Burt (1988), 38 C.C.C. (3d) 229(Sask. C.A.); R. v. Gray (1988), 54
Man. R. (2d) 240 (Man.C.A.);R. v. Smith, an unreported judgment of the
Yukon Court of AppealCourt, rendered June 27, 1989; R. v. Sutherland
(1990), 55 C.C.C.(3d) 265 (N.S.C.A.). See also the judgment of the Federal
Court,Trial division, in I.L.W.U. v. Canada, [1990] 2 C.F. 449
(reversedon other grounds: [1992] 3 F.C. 758 (F.C.A.); conf'd, [1994] 1S.C.R.
150 ).
8. [1987] 2 R.C.S. 383 .
9. 417 U.S. 733 (1973).
10. 455 U.S. 489
(1982).
11. R. v. Big M Drug
Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 , at pp.
313-314.
12. Per Gonthier J.
in Canadian Pacific Limited, supra, at p.188.
13. At p. 643.
14. In his separate
reasons concurring in the result, the ChiefJustice, joined by Sopinka and Cory
JJ., specifically adopted thesame test and expressed, as to the issue of
vagueness, his"substantial agreement with Gonthier J.'s s. 7
analysis".
15. At p. 175.
16. R. v. Nova
Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, supra,
at p. 627.
17. At p. 176.
18. Ibid.
19. In Canadian
Pacific Limited, the charges had been broughtunder s. 13(1)(a) of Ontario's
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O.1980, c. 141 (now s. 14(1) of the
Environmental Protection Act,R.S.O., 1990, c. E-19).
20. At p. 177.
21. Ibid.
22. Op. cit., supra, note 3, at pp. 539-540.
23. Ibid., at p. 540.
24. Gilles Pépin et Yves Ouellette, Principes de
contentieuxadministratif, 2e éd., Editions Yvons Blais Inc.,
Cowansville,1982, at p. 126.
25. For the administrative law
doctrine, see Patrice Garant,Droit administratif, 3e éd., T. I, Editions
Yvons Blais Inc.,Cowansville, 1991, p. 391, note 230. For the constitutional lawdoctrine, see Canadian Pacific
Limited, at pp. 175 ff., perGonthier J., and Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society, at pp. 626 ff.
26. Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society, supra, at p.
643.
27. Canadian Pacific
Limited, supra, per
Gonthier J., at par.175.
28. Black's Law
Dictionary, 6th ed., West Publishing Co.,
St-Paul (Minn.), 1990, p. 728.
29. The Dictionary
of Canadian Law, Carswell, Scarborough,
1991,p. 696.
30. See, for
example, Chaurest et al. v. Pilon, (1908) 17 B.R.283 (Que. Q.B); Séguin
v. Cousineau, (1922) 33 B.R. 556 (Que.Q.B.); Girard v. Price Brothers
Co., (1929) 47 B.R. 68 (Que. Q.B.);and Letang c. Corporation du Village
de la Pointe-Gatineau, (1939)66 B.R. 417 (Que. Q.B.).
31. Deposition of Jean-Paul Boucher, appellants' factum,particularly
at pp. 293 ff. See Décret concernant la politique deprotection des rives, du
littoral et des plaines innondables, O.C.1980-87, 22 december 1987, G.O.Q.
1988.II.365.
32. Canadian Pacific
Limited, supra, at p. 178, per
Gonthier J.