COURT OF APPEAL
PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC
MONTRÉAL REGISTRY
No: 500‑10‑000063‑931
(500‑36‑000584‑923)
CORAM: THE HONOURABLE NICHOLS
ROTHMAN
TOURIGNY, JJ.A.
LES TERRASSES ST-SULPICE INC.,
APPELLANT - (Accused)
v.
SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE,
RESPONDENT - (Prosecutrix)
and
LE JUGE LOUIS-JACQUES LÉGER DE LA COUR MUNICIPALE DE MONTRÉAL,
RESPONDENT
and
L'HONORABLE PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL DU QUÉBEC,
GIL REMILLARD,
LE JUGE JEAN MASSÉ DE LA COUR MUNICIPALE DE MONTRÉAL,
ME JEAN TEASDALE
GREFFIER DE LA COUR MUNICIPALE,
SERGENT DÉTECTIVE RENÉ JULIEN DU SERVICE DE POLICE DE LA C.U.M.,
MIS EN CAUSE
OPINION OF ROTHMAN, J.A.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing an application under Sec. 265 of the Code of Penal Procedure of Quebec (1987 S.Q. ch. 96) and Art. 834 C.C.P.. In its application, appellant Les Terrasses St-Sulpice Inc. sought to exercise an extraordinary recourse for the purpose of attacking the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Montreal to hear a complaint under the Alcoholic Beverages Offences Act (R.S.Q. I-8.1) and for the purpose of attacking the complaint itself and the summons issued by the Municipal Court judge.
The central question in this appeal is whether or not the judges of the Municipal Court of Montreal have jurisdiction to hear proceedings relative to offences under the Alcoholic Beverages Offences Act. Both the Municipal Court and the Superior Court concluded the Municipal Court did have jurisdiction to hear the proceedings. Appellant contends that it does not.
Appellant also contends that the police officer who filed the complaint was not legally authorized to do so.
The grounds of appeal raised by appellant are as follows:
«II - LES QUESTIONS EN LITIGE
a)L'honorable juge Kevin Downs a erré en droit en statuant que la Cour Municipale de Montréal avait juridiction pour agir eu égard à la Loi sur les infractions en matière de boissons alcooliques (L.R.Q., chapitre I-8.1);
b)l'honorable juge Kevin Downs a erré en droit en omettant de statuer sur la nullité de la dénonciation du sergent René Julien du Service de police de la Communauté urbaine de Montréal, lequel n'a aucune autorisation valable pour se porter dénonciateur et intenter des poursuites en vertu de la Loi sur les infractions en matières de boissons alcooliques;
c)l'honorable juge Kevin Downs a erré en droit en omettant de déclarer nulle «ab initio» la plainte portant le numéro 32-4042 de la Cour municipale de Montréal puisqu'aucune instruction du procureur général n'avait été donnée en vue d'instituer une poursuite.»
* * * * *
As a preliminary objection to appellant's application under Sec. 265, both before the Superior Court and in the present appeal before our Court, counsel for respondent urged that Sec. 265 specifically precluded any such recourse in cases where there was a possible appeal of the judgment, either de plano or with leave. He contended that since there was an appeal of the judgment of the Municipal Court with leave of the Court of Appeal, the Superior Court should have simply dismissed the application on that basis and without going into the merits of the application.
It is true that Sec. 265 of the Code of Penal Procedure precludes extraordinary recourses contemplated under Art. 834 of the Code of Civil Procedure where it is possible to appeal the decision one wishes to attack. But since the ground of attack in this case goes directly to the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court to hear the proceedings, and particularly since the case had not been pleaded or tried on the merits, in my view, it was entirely appropriate for the Superior Court to hear the application and to decide the question of jurisdiction at the outset.
Questions involving true absence or excess of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court may always be asserted before the Superior Court under its superintending and reforming power (Art. 846 C.C.P.). The final paragraph of Art. 846 C.C.P. makes it plain, in my view, that true jurisdictional questions may be evoked before the Superior Court whether or not the judgment is susceptible of appeal. The Court must, of course, be vigilant to assure that its superintending power is not invoked to delay matters unduly where there is a possible right of appeal and where there is not really an absence of jurisdiction, but that is not the case here.
The Superior Court was therefore empowered to decide the question of jurisdiction raised in the application, and this notwithstanding the existence of a right of appeal.
THE LEGALITY OF THE COMPLAINT
In my respectful opinion, there is no merit to this ground. Quite apart from the question of whether the issue was a question of absence or excess of jurisdiction within the meaning of Art. 846 C.C.P., I am satisfied that the complainant was legally authorized, under Sec. 132(c) of the Alcoholic Beverages Offences Act, to file the complaint and initiate the proceedings.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT
In essence, appellant contends that, prior to October 1, 1990, the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court to hear proceedings under the Alcoholic Beverages Offences Act was founded on Sec. 131 of that Act which provided as follows:
«Les poursuites prises en vertu de la présente loi sont régies par la partie 1 de la Loi sur les poursuites sommaires, chap. p-15, et par les dispositions ci-après édictées dans la présente section.
Ces poursuites peuvent être intentées au choix du poursuivant devant un juge des sessions, un juge de la Cour provinciale, deux juges de paix ou toute autre personne ayant la juridiction de deux juges de paix, sauf les dispositions de l'article 5 de la Loi sur les poursuites sommaires.»
On October 1, 1990, with the coming into force of the new
Code of Penal Procedure, Sec. 131 of the Alcoholic Beverages Offences
Act was repealed. Appellant contends that, in repealing Sec. 131,
the Legislature deprived the Municipal Court of its jurisdiction to hear cases
under that Act. It relies, in that regard, on a dissenting opinion expressed
by Mr. Justice Beauregard in Les Terrasses St-Sulpice Inc. v. R. (C.A.M.
no. 500-10-000038-925
, 11 November 1992, coram: Beauregard, Proulx, Fish).
With great respect, I do not agree that, in repealing Sec. 131 of the Alcohol Beverages Offences Act, the Legislature removed from the Municipal Court of Montreal jurisdiction to hear penal proceedings under that Act. The repeal of Sec. 131 must be seen in the context of a comprehensive reform of penal procedure in Quebec introduced by the enactment of the Code of Penal Procedure (1987 S.Q. ch. 96) and the repeal of the old Summary Convictions Act. (R.S.Q. ch. P-15)
The principal purpose of the enactment of the new Code of Penal Procedure was to create a uniform code of procedure of general application governing all penal proceedings seeking penal sanctions for offenses under Quebec laws and regulations, with the sole exception of disciplinary proceedings.
Art. 1 of the new Code provides:
«1. (Application du code) Le Présent code s'applique à l'égard des poursuites visant la sanction pénale des infractions aux lois, sauf à l'égard des poursuites intentées devant une instance disciplinaire.»
In their «Code de Procédure Pénal du Québec Annoté», page 3, Gilles Létourneau and Pierre Robert note that purpose of Art. 1 was:
«Cette disposition définit le domaine général d'application du Code qui vise les procédures relatives à la constatation, à la répression et à la sanction pénale des infractions créées par la législation et la réglementation québécoises. Le Code de procédure pénale est la législation d'application générale en droit pénal québécois et, sauf l'exclusion du droit disciplinaire, la loi ne prévoit pas de dérogation à la généralité de son application.»
Because the new Code of Penal Procedure was to be a code of general application governing penal proceedings under all Quebec laws, with its coming into force, in October 1990, the Legislature also adopted amending legislation (1990 S.Q. ch. 4) repealing the Summary Convictions Act and amending several hundred provincial acts which had previously contained varied and specific procedures for the prosecution of penal offences under those acts. The repeal of Sec. 131 of the Alcoholic Beverages Offences Act was one of those amendments and the purpose was to replace it with the uniform procedure under the new Code.
In addition to providing a comprehensive Code of Procedure for penal proceedings under Quebec legislation, the new Code also did away with the jurisdiction, in these provincial proceedings, of two justices of the peace contemplated under Sec. 3 of the former Summary Convictions Act.
Art. 3 of the new Code provides:
«3. (Cours et tribunaux compétents) Les pouvoirs conférés et les devoirs imposés à un juge en vertu du présent code sont exercés par la Cour du Québec ou une cour municipale, dans les limites de leur compétence respective prévues par la loi, ou par un juge de paix, dans les limites prévues par la loi et par son acte de nomination.»
(emphasis added)
Counsel for Appellant contends that Art. 3 of the new Code is not attributive of jurisdiction since there is nothing in the Charter of the City of Montreal conferring jurisdiction on the Municipal Court or its judges to hear proceedings under the Alcoholic Beverages Offences Act, and, with the repeal of Sec. 131 of that Act, there is no longer anything in that Act conferring jurisdiction on the Municipal Court. Appellant suggests that the phrase «...dans les limites de leur compétence respective prévues par la loi...» in Art. 3 of the Code supports this argument.
In my view, however, that phrase was only intended to indicate that the jurisdiction conferred on the courts, judges and justices of the peace in Sec. 3 was subject to any limitations on their respective jurisdictions imposed by law or by the terms of their appointments. It was not intended to mean that no jurisdiction was conferred by Sec. 3 of the Code except to the extent that the specific power to exercise it could be found in some other statute. Sec. 3 itself confers jurisdiction. But there are, in some cases, statutory limits on that jurisdiction. The text itself suggests that interpretation «... limites de leur compétence respective prévues par la loi...». (See, by way of contrast, the text of Sec. 370 of the Code with respect to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court)
Thus Art. 1116 of the Charter of the City of Montreal provides that every municipal judge is, ex officio, a justice of the peace, but his or her jurisdiction is limited to the district of Montreal.
«1116. Tout juge municipal est d'office, juge de paix pour le district de Montréal et revêtu de tous les droits et pouvoirs et de l'autorité de la Cour municipale, a le pouvoir de deux juges de paix pour l'application des lois du Parlement du Canada qui requièrent cette compétence, avec la même juridiction dans toute la province de Québec que celle prévue par l'article 358 de la Loi des tribunaux judiciaires.
Tout juge municipal peut, à la discrétion du conseil, faire partie d'une commission chargée de la révision et de la refonte de la charte de la ville.»
This provision does, of course, limit the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and its judges in provincial penal proceedings to the district of Montreal, as contemplated in Sec. 2 of the Courts of Justice Act (R.S.Q. ch. T-16):
«2. ...; the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts is restricted to localities.»
(Sec. 128 of the Courts of Justice Act, on the other hand, provides that the judges of the Court of Quebec are ex-officio justices of the peace for the whole of Quebec.)
In short, under Art. 1 of the Code, it applies generally to the prosecution of offences having penal sanctions created under Quebec acts and regulations. Art. 3 of the Code confers on the judges of the Municipal Court of Montreal the jurisdiction to hear and decide penal proceedings under these acts or regulations. Their jurisdiction in provincial penal proceedings is, however, limited to the District of Montreal.
The phrase in Art. 3 of the Code «... dans les limites...» refers to any statutory limits on jurisdiction, such as the territorial limits of Municipal Courts. It does not mean that the jurisdiction, under Sec. 3, of the courts, judges and justices of the peace to hear penal proceedings under Quebec statutes must be found in the legislation creating the offences or in the legislation creating these courts.
In commenting on the purpose of Art. 3 of the Code, Létourneau and Robert (supra, page 9) state:
«Il s'agit d'une disposition attributive de juridiction pénale aux tribunaux mentionnés ainsi qu'aux juges de paix.»
I agree.
I would dismiss the appeal.
MELVIN L. ROTHMAN, J.A.